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Abstract We analyze the dynamics of evolutionary games in which fitness
is defined as an affine function of the expected payoff and a constant contri-
bution. The resulting inhomogeneous replicator equation has an homogeneous
equivalent with modified payoffs. The affine terms also influence the stochastic
dynamics of a two-strategy Moran model of a finite population. We then ap-
ply the affine fitness function in a model for tumor-normal cell interactions to
determine which are the most successful tumor strategies. In order to analyze
the dynamics of concurrent strategies within a tumor population, we extend
the model to a three-strategy game involving distinct tumor cell types as well
as normal cells. In this model, interaction with normal cells, in combination
with an increased constant fitness, is the most effective way of establishing a
population of tumor cells in normal tissue.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics describes changes in populations of competing individ-
uals over time (Nowak, 2006a). These changes depend on the notion of fitness,
a quantity that describes how many offspring a member of the population is
expected to produce. In the simplest model of fitness, the number of offspring
depends only on the individual itself and not on other individuals or the en-
vironment. More generally, fitness may be modeled as frequency-dependent,
accounting for interactions among individuals. In evolutionary game theory,
fitness is modeled as the outcome of a game whose players adopt distinct strate-
gies; in this framework, individuals are identified with the strategy they play
(Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003). The fitness assigned to
a given strategy is typically defined as the expected payoff resulting from play-
ing the game with all other strategies present in the population, and in this
case, fitness is a linear function of the frequencies. Recently, nonlinear fitness
functions have also been discussed (Taylor and Nowak, 2006; Pru¨gel-Bennett,
1994; Altrock and Traulsen, 2009; Traulsen et al., 2008, 2007).
An example of an evolving system is the cell population of a tumor. Tu-
mors arise from normal cells in an organism through mutations that increase
their somatic fitness, which leads to outgrowth of normal tissue by the tumor
and eventually to invasion of other organs (Cairns, 1975; Nowell, 1976). The
increased proliferation of cancer cells is, in part, due to interactions with nor-
mal cells (Axelrod et al., 2006). One example of tumor-stroma interactions
is vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) signaling (Mueller and Fusenig,
2004). Many tumors secrete the mobile growth factor VEGF which stimulates
the production of blood vessels. Angiogenesis, in turn, increases the fitness of
tumor cells through the supply with nutrients and oxygen. Using experimental
and bioinformatics methods, it has recently been estimated that cancer cells
make up only 49% of the cells in tumor tissue (Van Loo et al., 2010). The sur-
prisingly high fraction of normal cells in a tumor indicates that normal cells
play an important role in tumor development. However, it remains elusive to
which extent the interaction between normal and tumor cells may contribute
to the proliferative advantage of tumor cells.
To quantify the somatic evolution of tumors mathematical models are used
(Michor et al., 2004). Approaches include population genetics models (Beeren-
winkel et al., 2007; Durrett et al., 2009; Gerstung and Beerenwinkel, 2010;
Bozic et al., 2010) that describe the accumulation of driver mutations which
confer a fitness advantage to the tumor cells, and evolutionary game theory
models (Basanta and Deutsch, 2008). Game-theoretic approaches were used to
describe both interactions of tumor cells with the environment (Gatenby and
Vincent, 2003) as well as among tumor cells (Tomlinson, 1997). Interactions
are not restricted to be pairwise. For example, Dingli et al. (2009) recently
analyzed the joint interactions of multiple myeloma cells with osteoclast and
osteoblast cells in the framework of evolutionary games.
In the present work, we model fitness to be composed both of a game-
theoretic interaction term and a constant term specific to each cell type. This
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choice is motivated by the fact that cancer cells harbor multiple mutations,
which can affect cell-cell interactions, alter intrinsic behavior, or both. Hence,
the fitness function is an affine function of the relative frequencies of normal
and tumor cells.
We first analyze the evolutionary dynamics in general in the framework of
the replicator equation. Specifically, we clarify the role of the interaction term
relative to the constant fitness term. We show that the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, which does not allow for the evolution of cooperation, is transformed
by adding a constant fitness term in such a way that cooperation becomes
possible for certain parameter choices of the affine fitness function. We also
analyze how the affine fitness terms affect the stability criteria for a Moran
model of a two-strategy game in a finite population.
The results for the continuous replicator model are then applied to assess
whether exploitation of normal cells or intrinsic proliferation is more evolution-
arily favorable for a tumor cell. We analyze a set of tumor strategies leading
to the same equilibrium with normal cells in a pairwise game, and find that
the strategy with both a constant fitness advantage and attraction of normal
cells is most successful in the competition with other tumor strategies.
2 Inhomogeneous evolutionary games in infinite populations
We consider a game with n strategies and payoff matrix M ∈ Rn×n. The
entry mij ofM denotes the payoff to strategy i if playing against strategy j.
In evolutionary game theory, a fixed strategy is associated to each individual.
In our application, we think of the strategy as being determined by the genetic
changes of the cancer cell and we identify strategies with genotypes and with
cell types. We first assume an infinite population size and describe the state
of the population by the vector
x ∈ Sn−1 =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
(1)
of relative strategy frequencies. The state space Sn−1 is the (n−1)-dimensional
probability simplex. The fitness of a type i individual is the expected payoff
fi(x) =
n∑
j=1
mijxj . (2)
Let us assume now that fitness is composed of such a linear term arising from
a game plus a constant term ri ∈ R. In vector notation, the resulting affine
fitness function is
f(x) =Mx + r (3)
where r ∈ Rn. For r = (0, . . . , 0)>, we recover the strong selection limit, where
fitness is directly given by the expected payoff of the game. For w ∈ R+, w  1,
and r = (1− w, . . . , 1− w)>, the affine fitness function can be interpreted as
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that of the game with payoff M ′ := (1/w)M in the weak selection limit:
f(x) = wM ′x + (1 − w, . . . , 1 − w)>. In both limiting cases, all components
of the constant term r are identical. In the following, we relax this constraint
and allow the components ri to be different for each strategy.
For infinite population size, the dynamics of reproducing individuals can
be described by the replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Zeeman,
1980; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983) as
x˙i = xi [fi(x)− φ(x)] , i = 1, . . . , n (4)
where φ(x) = x>f(x) is the average fitness of the population. The fixed points
of this system are the solutions of the set of algebraic equations x˙ = 0. The
replicator equation always has the n trivial solutions x∗ given by x∗i = 1 and
x∗j = 0, for all j 6= i. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) provide a general proof
for the possible number of internal equilibria in two-player, n-strategy games.
A more general system is considered in Gokhale and Traulsen (2010).
For the affine fitness function defined in Eq. 3, the replicator equation 4
is said to be inhomogeneous. The inhomogeneous replicator equation can be
interpreted as the (homogeneous) replicator equation of a transformed game.
Theorem 1 (Stadler, 1991) The inhomogeneous replicator equation with
affine fitness function f(x) =Mx + r is equivalent to the homogeneous repli-
cator equation with linear fitness function f ′(x) =M ′x with
m′ij = mij + ri. (5)
Proof Because
∑n
j=1 xj = 1, one has
f ′i(x) =
n∑
j=1
(mij + ri)xj =
n∑
j=1
mijxj + ri = fi(x). (6)
It follows that φ′(x) = x>f ′(x) = φ(x). Hence we have fi(x)−φ(x) = f ′i(x)−
φ′(x), which completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that the replicator dynamics induced by an affine fitness
function can be obtained from an equivalent homogeneous replicator equa-
tion. However the evolutionary dynamics of the transformed gameM ′ can be
substantially different from the one based onM alone.
3 Two-player games in infinite populations
Passing from a linear to an affine fitness function by adding a constant fitness
term shifts the equilibrium of the replicator equation. We consider the inho-
mogeneous replicator equation for two types of individuals (strategies) A and
B with
M =
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
and r =
(
s
t
)
. (7)
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Behavior Schematic Parameter Range
Stable internal equilibrium A→ x∗ ← B α < σ < β
Unstable internal equilibrium A← x∗ → B α > σ > β
A dominates B A←− B σ < α, β
B dominates A A −→ B σ > α, β
Table 1 Stability of the 2-strategy replicator equation with affine fitness function with
gameM and offset r, Eq. 7. Parameters are as in Eq. 8. Arrows indicate the change in the
composition of the population over time.
By Theorem 1, there exists a non-trivial fixed point in which the proportion
of A individuals in the population is given by
x∗ =
β − σ
β − α, (8)
where we have defined α = a− c, β = b− d, and σ = t− s. The fixed point x∗
is attractive and in (0, 1) if and only if
α < σ < β, (9)
that is, if the difference in constant fitness σ is between the differences in
payoff α and β. It follows that for any game with α < β there exist constant
fitness contributions r such that σ satisfies (9) and x∗ is a stable, non-trivial
equilibrium point.
Apart from the stable equilibrium, dominance of A (denoted by B → A),
dominance of B (A→ B), and an unstable equilibrium at x∗ are possible. The
parameter regimes leading to these dynamics are summarized in Table 1.
3.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a metaphor for the evolution of cooperation (Ax-
elrod and Hamilton, 1981). This game is defined by the inequalities
b < d < a < c (10)
Strategy A is called cooperation and denoted C, whereas strategy B is called
defection and denoted D. The inequalities imply that α, β < 0. For linear
fitness functions, the non-trivial fixed point x∗ lies outside of the unit interval;
thus xA = 0, xB = 1 is the only attractive fixed point and cooperation cannot
evolve in this model.
For affine fitness functions, however, there does exist a stable equilibrium
between cooperators and defectors provided that α < σ < β, as shown in the
previous section (Figure 1). The necessary condition α < β does not hold for
all Prisoner’s Dilemma games. If β < α, then there exists only an unstable
fixed point in (0, 1) (Figure 1). In both cases, the all-cooperator equilibrium is
stable, since σ < β. It is unique if in addition σ < min{α, β}. In this regime,
constant selection dominates the dynamics of the evolutionary game, always
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Fig. 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma game with constant fitness advantage σ of the cooperators.
The solid black lines denote the frequency of cooperators x∗C at the stable fixed point
x∗ = (x∗C , x
∗
D)
> as a function of σ = t − s. Dashed lines are unstable fixed points. For
α < β, there exists a stable equilibrium (left, grey area) if α < σ < β. For β < α, the
internal fixed point at β < σ < α is unstable (right plot). For the homogeneous Prisoner’s
Dilemma, σ = 0, defection is always stable.
favouring cooperators over defectors. Conversely, if σ > α, there exists a stable
all-defectors equilibrium, which is unique if in addition σ > max{α, β}.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been studied in many variations in order to
derive conditions under which cooperation can evolve. For example, Nowak
(2006a) listed five rules for the evolution of cooperation. To formulate and to
compare these rules, often a simplified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
considered, where a cost c is paid for cooperation, of which other cells receive a
benefit b. Defectors do not pay a cost, and other cells do not receive a benefit
from defectors:
M =
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
(11)
We consider the affine fitness function obtained from this simplified Prisoner’s
Dilemma game plus a constant fitness term. Because α = β = −c, the repli-
cator dynamics do not allow for stable coexistence between cooperators and
defectors. However, both pure strategies can be stable, namely cooperation for
σ < −c, or equivalently,
t− s > c (12)
and defection otherwise (Figure 1). Hence, selection favors cooperators if the
constant fitness advantage is higher than the cost to pay for cooperation.
This rule for the evolution of cooperation makes precise the tradeoff between
constant fitness contributions and those resulting from playing the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game.
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4 Inhomogeneous two-player games in finite populations
The deterministic replicator equation describes the dynamics of infinite pop-
ulations. In finite populations a stochastic description in which interactions
between members of the population are considered individually is more ap-
propriate.
We consider a finite population of constant size N , containing as before
two types of individuals (strategies) A and B.M and r are defined as in Eq. 7.
Let i denote the number of A individuals in the population, and denote by Fi
and Gi the sum of the expected game payoff and the constant fitness term for
types A and B respectively. We have
Fi =
(i− 1)a+ (N − i)b
N − 1 + s =
(i− 1)(a+ s) + (N − i)(b+ s)
N − 1 (13)
Gi =
ic+ (N − i− 1)d
N − 1 + t =
i(c+ t) + (N − i− 1)(d+ t)
N − 1 . (14)
Also for a finite population the entries of M may be transformed according
to Eq. 5 to an equivalent homogeneous game M ′. Yet the resulting changes
of the stochastic dynamics in a finite population differ from those that arise
in an infinite population. In the following, we discuss three different measures
for the evolutionary success of a strategy in a finite population and study how
these are affected by the constant fitness terms.
Following Nowak et al. (2004), we say that A resists invasion by B, or that
A is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESSN ), if GN−1 < FN−1, i.e., if one
B individual in an otherwise all-A population has lower fitness than the B
individuals. This condition may equivalently be written as
(N − 1)(α− σ) > a− b, (15)
where σ = t− s, as above. Note that for N →∞, this condition is equivalent
to σ < α, from which it follows that xA = 0 is an unstable fixed point of
the replicator equation (Table 1). Similarly, one obtains that B is ESSN if
FN−1 > GN−1, or
(N − 1)(β − σ) < c− d, (16)
which is for large N again equivalent to σ < β.
The Moran process (Moran, 1962) provides one model for evolutionary
dynamics in finite populations. In each step of the process, one individual is
chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to its fitness; its offspring
replaces another individual, chosen at random from the population. Denote by
Pi,j the probability that given i A individuals, one step of the process yields
j A individuals. We have
Pi,i+1 =
ifi
ifi + (N − i)gi ·
N − i
N
(17)
Pi,i−1 =
(N − i)gi
ifi + (N − i)gi ·
i
N
(18)
Pi,i = 1− Pi,i+1 − Pi,i−1, (19)
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and Pi,j = 0 otherwise. To compute the fixation probabilities in the presence
of an affine fitness term, we consider the limit of weak selection (Taylor et al.,
2004; Antal and Scheuring, 2006; Lessard and Ladret, 2007; Wu et al., 2010).
We define the frequency-dependent fitness for types A and B, respectively, by
fi = 1− w + wFi (20)
gi = 1− w + wGi, (21)
where the parameter w ∈ (0, 1) defines the intensity of selection. Small values
of w indicate near-neutral evolutionary pressure (Kimura, 1985; Ohta, 2002)
The fixation probability of type A, i.e., the probability that one A indi-
vidual will take over an otherwise all-B population, in the Moran process is
ρA = [1+
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
i=1(gi/fi)]
−1 (Karlin and Taylor, 1975; Taylor et al., 2004).
For small w a power series expansion yields
ρA =
1
N
· 1
1− w ((xN − y)/6− (N − 1)σ/2) , (22)
where x = a+ 2b− c− 2d = α+ 2β and y = 2a+ b+ c− 4d (Nowak, 2006a).
Further details about the convergence of the weak selection limit can be found
in Wu et al. (2010).
For an A mutant with no fitness advantage over B, we have ρA = 1/N. We
say A is advantageous (AD), if selection favors the fixation of A, ρA > 1/N ,
or equivalently
xN − y − 3(N − 1)σ > 0. (23)
For large N , this becomes
σ <
α+ 2β
3
. (24)
Hence this condition is fulfilled if the condition σ < α, β for the replicator
equation holds. Equilibrium is reached when Fi = Gi, or equivalently
i =
β − σ
β − α, (25)
in agreement with the continuous case, Eq. 8.
Lastly, we say A is risk-dominant (RD) over B if ρA > ρB . In the case of
weak selection, this is equivalent to
α+ β
2
N − 6(a− d)− (N − 1)σ > 0. (26)
For large N , A is RD if, and only if
α+ β
2
− σ > 0 (27)
holds. The criteria for AD, ESSN , and RD are summarized in Table 2. Note
that all are fulfilled if σ < α, as required for A to be evolutionarily stable in
the replicator equation.
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Criterion Small population Large population
ESSN (N − 1)(α− σ) < a− b σ < α
AD xN − y − 3(N − 1)σ > 0 σ < (α+ 2β)/3
RD (α+ β)N/2− 6(a− d)− (N − 1)σ > 0 σ < (α+ β)/2
Table 2 Criteria for the evolutionary stability of strategy A in finite populations of small
and large size.
As N grows large it is also possible to compute the expected time until
fixation. As shown by Antal and Scheuring (2006), the fixation time for an
AD strategy starting from a single mutant scales like N lnN , whereas that
of a neutral strategy scales like N2. The affine modification affects whether a
strategy is advantageous but not the scaling of the fixation time.
4.1 Affine Prisoner’s Dilemma in finite populations
We return to the affine modification of the Prisoner’s Dilemma defined in
Eq. 11, considering it now in a finite population of size N . We have
ρC =
1
N
· 1
1 + w2 ((N − 1)(σ + c)− b)
. (28)
Cooperation is AD, ρC > 1/N , if
− σ > c− b
N − 1 . (29)
That is, the constant fitness advantage −σ must be larger than the cost of
cooperation c minus the benefit b divided by the population size minus one.
It thus appears that the fixation probability of cooperators is higher in small
populations, than in large ones. ForN →∞ condition Eq. 29 results in−σ > c,
again in agreement with the continuous case.
Because we have α = −c = β, the conditions for ESSN and RD are equiv-
alent to −σ > c. For σ = 0, cooperation satisfies none of the criteria for evo-
lutionary success. However, in the affine case, each such criterion is fulfilled if
the constant fitness advantage −σ is higher than the cost c. Thus cooperation
can also arise in small populations if cooperators can compensate the cost of
cooperation by a constant fitness surplus.
5 Coevolution of tumor and normal cells
Tumors present an example of the evolution of defection, because cancer cells
have lost their normal cooperative behavior and defect the host (Michor et al.,
2004). However, experiments indicate that tumors consist of about 50% of non-
cancerous cells. This fraction appears to be consistent among distinct cancer
subtypes (Van Loo et al., 2010), which raises the possibility that the normal
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cells are not the result of a random admixture, but constitute an attractive
equilibrium resulting from interactions of tumor and normal cells.
As shown in section 3, the two-player dynamics only depends on the dif-
ference α and β, as well as σ. For a given attractive equilibrium, there exist
thus many parameter combinations. In the following, we set x∗ = (1/2, 1/2),
which is reasonably close to the experimentally observed ratio of 49% tumor
cells (Van Loo et al., 2010). We observe that this choice implies σ = 12 (α+β),
which reduces the number of independent parameters to two.
To explore the range of possible parameter combinations, we define the
following three tumor cell strategies to be played against a normal cell type:
T1 : α1 = −1 β1 = 1 σ1 = 0
T2 : α2 = −2 β2 = 0 σ2 = −1
T3 : α3 = 0 β3 = 2 σ3 = 1
(30)
When played pairwise against normal cells all three strategies lead to a sta-
ble equilibrium at x∗N = 1/2. Tumor strategy T1 presents a mixed strategy
of exploitation and attraction of normal cells, without an additional intrinsic
fitness advantage. T2 is a strategy that strongly exploits (Prisoner’s Dilemma),
however at a the cost of a disadvantage in terms of the constant fitness con-
tribution. T3 is a mixed strategy that has both a constant fitness advantage
and the ability to recruit healthy cells.
5.1 Three-player games
In large tumors a huge genetic diversity is generated due to the large number
of cells and a potentially increased mutation rate (Beerenwinkel et al., 2007;
Bozic et al., 2010). It is thus likely that many different tumor cell types with
specific strategies are present in the tumor simultaneously. Hence a strategy
able to dominate many others will be successful in taking over a tumor.
Let H denote the normal (healthy) cell type and T1 a tumor strategy.
Again there is an affine payoff function for the tumor-normal interaction with
the payoff matrix M and constant fitness r. Now consider a second tumor
strategy T2. Assuming no interactions among the tumor cell types, the payoff
matrix and fitness vector for the three strategies are
M =

H T1 T2
H a b1 b2
T1 c1 d1 0
T2 c2 0 d2
, r =
 st1
t2
 . (31)
According to Theorem 1 the affine fitness function can be rewritten in terms
of the game
M ′ =

H T1 T2
H 0 0 0
T1 −α1 + σ1 −β1 + σ1 −b2 + σ1
T2 −α2 + σ2 −b1 + σ2 −β2 + σ2
, (32)
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where the first row has been subtracted from all rows to obtain a representation
in terms of αi, βi, and σi, i = 1, 2. Interestingly, the constant fitness terms
lead to an effective interaction term among the tumor strategies. Moreover,
the interactions, m′T1,T2 = −b1 + σ2 and m′T2,T1 = −b2 + σ1, depend on the
absolute value of b1 and b2, i.e., on the payoff that a tumor pays to the fitness
of normal cells.
We now investigate the replicator dynamics for the transformed game de-
fined in Eq. 32 and the tumor strategies defined in Eq. 30, following Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1998); Bomze (1983). One has αi − σi = −1, and βi − σi = 1,
i = 1, . . . , 3. We also assume that b1 = b2 =: b, any difference can be subsumed
into the parameters βi. It follows that
M ′ =

H T1 T2
H 0 0 0
T1 1 −1 −b− σ1
T2 1 −b− σ2 −1
 (33)
This game has the non-trivial fixed points x∗ = (1/2, 1/2, 0)>, and x∗ =
(1/2, 0, 1/2)>. However, it depends on the parameter b whether these are stable
or saddle points. As shown in Appendix A, there exists an additional fixed
point in the interior of S2 at
x∗ = (ω1, ω2, ω3)>/ω (34)
with
ω1 = 1− (b− σ1)(b− σ2)
ω2 = 1− (b− σ1)
ω3 = 1− (b− σ2), (35)
and ω =
∑
ωi, if, and only if, all ωi have the same sign, sgnω1 = sgnω2 =
sgnω3 (Stadler and Schuster, 1990).
The dynamic behavior of all three player games HTiTj of the normal cell
type with two of the tumor strategies T1, T2, and T3 can be divided into the
following four cases:
(i) For
b <
σ1 + σ2
2
−
√(
σ1 + σ2
2
)2
− (1− σ1σ2) (36)
the normal cell type goes extinct. There exist only a stable equilibrium of
the two tumor strategies. In this case the constant fitness advantages of
both tumor types are so large that despite the payoff b to the normal cell
type, H dies out.
(ii) In the regime
σ1 + σ2
2
−
√(
σ1 + σ2
2
)2
− (1− σ1σ2) < b < 1 + min{σ1, σ2} (37)
12 Moritz Gerstung et al.
Ti
H
Tj
l
l
l
Ti
H
Tj
l
l
l
Ti
H
Tj
l
l
Ti
H
Tj
l
l
(i) b = −2 (ii) b = −1 (iii) b = 1 (iv) b = 2
−−−−−−→ b
Fig. 2 Illustration of the dynamic regimes (i)–(iv). Specific values are for the game NT1T2
for different values of the parameter b. Red circles denote unstable fixed points, yellow
triangles are saddle points, and green squares are stable equilibria. For case (iii), the fixed
point on the edge NTi for the tumor strategy Ti with σi > σj is stable.
there exists a stable fixed point in the interior of the simplex. Hence all
three cell types coexist. In this regime the constant fitness advantage of
both tumor types are smaller than the fitness but not too large to have the
normal cell type go extinct.
(iii) If
1 + min{σ1, σ2} < b < 1 + max{σ1, σ2} (38)
there exists no interior fixed point. Then only the fixed point xH = 1/2,
xTi = 1/2, for σi > σj is stable. That is, the tumor strategy that has
the larger fitness advantage will win. Equivalently, we can write min{t1 −
s, t2 − s} < b − 1 < max{t1 − s, t2 − s}. In this case, the constant fitness
advantage of one tumor type is smaller than the payoff b minus 1, whereas
the other tumor types’ fitness advantage exceeds this value.
(iv) Lastly, for
b > 1 + max{σ1, σ2} (39)
there exists an interior saddle point and both fixed points at the edges, x∗ =
(1/2, 1/2, 0)>, and x∗ = (1/2, 0, 1/2)> are stable. Which tumor strategy
wins, depends on which of the two tumor strategies emerged first. The
condition is equivalent to b > 1+max{t1, t2}−s. In this regime, the payoff
to a normal cell b is larger than the constant fitness advantages to both
tumor types plus one. Therefore, both tumor types attract normal cells
more strongly than their constant fitness advantage.
The dynamics associated with each case are illustrated in Figure 2. These
different cases are realized for each game at different parameter values of b.
For b = 2 (Figure 3A), we have case (vi) for the game HT1T2, and case (iii) for
games HT1T3, HT2T3. Thus for HT1T2, whichever of the strategies T1 and T2
arises first will be successful and converges to an equilibrium with H. In the
other two games, however strategy T3 wins over T1, and T2, respectively. We
thus conclude that T3 is most successful. The coordinates of the equilibrium
interior equilibrium x∗ defined in Eq. 34 are depicted in Figure 3D for the
three games HT1T2, HT1T3, and HT2T3 as a function of the parameter b.
Because tumor strategy T3 has the largest constant fitness advantage,
σ3 > σ1 > σ2, it outcompetes the other tumor strategies for most values
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Fig. 3 A-C: Tumor strategies in the 3 player case for b = 2, 0,−1. Arrows denote the
direction, and colors the rate of change defined by the replicator equation, Eq. 4. Points
label the fixed points of the system, obtained by solving the algebraic equation defined by
x˙ = 0. Red circles are repelling fixed points (two real parts of the eigenvalues λi, i = 1, . . . 3,
of the Jacobian J(x∗) positive), yellow triangles: saddle points (1 real part positive), and
green squares are stable fixed points with two real parts negative. D: Position and stability
of the interior fixed point as a function of b for all three games. Again yellow dots denote
saddle points, green circles are stable fixed points.
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of b. If b is of moderate size, there exists an equilibrium with T1 (Figure 3B).
The equilibrium level lies, however, at low frequencies of T1. There also exists a
stable equilibrium with T2 for b < 0 (Figure 3C). Yet the latter appears biolog-
ically unrealistic, as it would effectively repel normal cells, which contradicts
the consensus of a positive interaction (Mueller and Fusenig, 2004).
Tumor strategy T1, which both exploits and attracts normal cells, wins over
T2 for b > 0. This is because of the fitness disadvantage of T2. In comparison
with T3, there is a bistable equilibrium for b > 2. For 0 < b < 2, however, T3
dominates T2.
The affine Prisoner’s Dilemma strategy T2 performs worst of all, because
it has a fitness disadvantage compared to normal cells, in contrast to the
other two tumor strategies. This disadvantage is required to generate a stable
equilibrium with normal cells. Due to this disadvantage, however, the strategy
is easily outcompeted by T1 and T3.
6 Discussion
In evolutionary games with affine fitness functions, the corresponding inhomo-
geneous replicator equation has an equivalent homogeneous replicator equa-
tion with a transformed game. The transformations of the game, however, can
cause substantial differences as compared to the original game. For n = 2
dimensions, the resulting changes can be fully characterized in terms of the
constant fitness difference σ. The affine transformations of the payoff matrix
also influence the stochastic Moran model of a finite population, and we have
evaluated how different criteria for the stability of a strategy are affected.
The affine terms also alter the dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a
prototype game for studying the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod and Hamil-
ton, 1981). In the presence of a constant fitness advantage, cooperation can
arise if the fitness advantage is higher than the cost to pay for cooperation. This
simple rule adds to the five rules for the evolution of cooperation that were
presented recently (Nowak, 2006b). It makes precise the intuitive idea that
cooperators can evolve if they compensate their disadvantage in the game by
an intrinsic fitness contribution.
In mathematical and computational models of cancer, reviewed recently
by Attolini and Michor (2009), evolutionary game theory provides a useful
tool for analyzing the role of cell differentiation and heterogeneity in tumor
initiation and progression. In the earliest studies applying evolutionary game
theory to cancer, Tomlinson and Bodmer investigated the effects on tumor
progression of several cell behaviors, including cytotoxicity, angiogenesis, and
apoptosis (Tomlinson, 1997; Tomlinson and Bodmer, 1997). Further studies
have used evolutionary game theory to model spatial dynamics (Bach et al.,
2003), tumor-host interaction (Gatenby and Vincent, 2003), and the interac-
tion of multiple tumor cell phenotypes (Bach et al., 2001), in particular those
of invasive or motile cells (Mansury et al., 2006; Basanta and Deutsch, 2008;
Basanta et al., 2008). In the present study, we take explicit account of the
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effects of affine transformations on evolutionary games in cancer, and we use
this framework to investigate interactions among cell types within the tumor
population.
Tumor cells present an example where defecting strategies arise in an organ-
ism of cooperating cells. Experimental data indicates that tumor cells exist in a
stable equilibrium with normal cells (Van Loo et al., 2010). We have therefore
analyzed what type of tumor strategies would lead to such coexisting states by
means of an inhomogeneous replicator equation. Fitness is modeled to contain
both a game-theoretic and a constant term. Because most parameters of the
model cannot be directly obtained by experiment, we assessed three different
prototype tumor strategies leading to the same equilibrium level. To get fur-
ther insight into the relative contributions of both the interactions with normal
cells, and the intrinsic tumor-specific fitness, we have analyzed the dynamics
of multiple tumor strategies. This approach is motivated by the finding that
in large populations, new cell types arise quickly through spontaneous muta-
tions. It is thus a requirement for a winning strategy to be able to compete
with many others, although many of them are likely to exist only in very low
frequencies.
The analysis of multiple tumor strategies in a three player game shows that
the affine fitness function introduces correction terms that cause an effective
interaction of the tumor cells. The strength of these interaction terms was
given by the constant fitness advantage, and the absolute payoff of tumor to
normal cells. We have then classified the dynamics of the system based on the
payoff to normal cells and the constant fitness advantage. We find that the
most successful tumor strategy has both a constant fitness advantage and a
payoff to normal cells (relative to the payoff to itself).
The payoff to normal cells could be mediated by a mobile growth factor
such as VEGF. This growth factors is secreted by tumor cells to attract blood
vessels that, in turn, supply the tumor with nutrients (Mueller and Fusenig,
2004). Interestingly, the interaction through VEGF is also a target for drug
interventions yet with ambivalent success (Carmeliet, 2005). Our analysis also
elucidates when such an intervention would be successful: In the replicator
dynamics, an equilibrium between tumor and normal cells exists only if a−c <
t− s < b− d. A therapeutic success would occur if normal cells dominate the
dynamics. This requires a − c and b − d to be larger than t − s. An VEGF
inhibitor would reduce the parameter b, ideally to zero. This is however, not
sufficient for the replicator dynamics to favour normal cells, because also a− c
must become larger than t−s. A successful therapy must additionally reduce c
to zero such that t− s < a. However, this may be difficult, or even impossible,
to achieve for tumor cells with a high constant fitness advantage.
In our model of tumor-normal interactions, all strategies were given. In
cancer, however, new strategies are thought to arise through mutations. In the
future it could thus be an interesting extension to the model to include mu-
tations that transform one strategy into another, see for example (Fudenberg
et al., 2006) for a general analysis of evolutionary game theory with mutations
in finite populations. Such an extension may also be capable of assessing the
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interactions with cancer stem cells, which are hypothesized to form a distinct
tumor subpopulation that replenishes normal tumor cells (Wicha et al., 2006;
Clarke et al., 2006).
A Fixed points of three player strategies
Rewrite matrixM ′ of Eq. 32 in normal form:
M ′ =

N T1 T2
N 0 β1 − σ1 β2 − σ2
T1 −α1 + σ1 0 β2 − b2 − σ2 + σ1
T2 −α2 + σ2 β1 − b1 − σ1 + σ2 0
 =:
0 δ γα 0 
η β 0
 . (40)
Now define:
ω1 = δ+ γβ − β (41)
ω2 = αγ + η − γη (42)
ω3 = ηδ + αβ − αδ (43)
One finds:
ω1 = (β1 − σ1)(β2 − σ2)− (b1 − σ2)(b2 − σ1) (44)
ω2 = (α2 − σ2)(b2 − σ1)− (α1 − σ1)(β2 − σ2) (45)
ω3 = (α1 − σ1)(b1 − σ2)− (α2 − σ2)(β1 − σ1), (46)
It can be shown (Stadler and Schuster, 1990) that there exists a fixed point in the
interior of S2, iff all ωi, i = 1, . . . , 3 have the same sign, sgnωi = Σ (Stadler and Schuster,
1990). Its coordinates are given by x∗ = (ω1, ω2, ω3)>/ω. The stability of x∗ is determined
by the determinant ∆ = αβγ + δη, that is:
∆ = (α1 − σ1)(b1 − σ2)(β2 − σ2) + (α2 − σ2)(b2 − σ1)(β1 − σ1)
− (β1 − σ1)(β2 − σ2)(α1 − σ1 + α2 − σ2). (47)
The interior fixed point is stable iff both eigenvalues of the Jacobian, λ1/2 = −Σ(∆ ±√
∆2 − 4ω1ω2ω3), have negative real parts. This requires that sgn∆ > 0, and Σ > 0. Hence
all ωi need to be positive.
These conditions simplify for the tumor strategies defined in Eq. 30. These imply αi −
σi = −1, and βi − σi = 1, i = 1, . . . , 3. With the additional assumption bi = b, i = 1, . . . , 3,
it follows that
ω1 = 1− (b− σ1)(b− σ2)
ω2 = 1− (b− σ1)
ω3 = 1− (b− σ2).
The determinant reads
∆ = 2− (b− σ1)− (b− σ2) = ω2 + ω3. (48)
Hence the condition sgn∆ = Σ is fulfilled if sgnω1 = sgnω2 = Σ. The conditions for each
ωi to be positive are:
ω1 > 0 ⇔
∣∣∣∣b+ σ1 + σ22
∣∣∣∣ <
√(
σ1 + σ2
2
)2
− (1− σ1σ2) (49)
ω2 > 0 ⇔ b > 1 + σ1 (50)
ω3 > 0 ⇔ b > 1 + σ2 (51)
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For the parameter values of the tumor strategies Ti considered here, ω1 < 0 if both ω2, and
ω3 are negative. It thus follows that all three ωi are negative, iff b > 1 + max{σ1, σ2}. Then
the interior fixed point x∗ is unstable. For the interior fixed point to be stable, all three
conditions Eq. 33–35 need to be fulfilled.
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